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Abstract
The execution time of object oriented programs can be drastically reduced by transform-
ing ”non escaping” objects into a collection of its component scalar data fields. But for
languages that support dynamic linking, this kind of optimization (which we call ”object
resolution”) can usually only be performed at runtime, when the entire program is avail-
able for analysis. In such cases, the resulting performance increases will be offset by the
additional costs that arise during the analysis and restructuring phases.
In this paper, we describe work in progress, which provides an annotation technique
that reduces the runtime overhead required for performing object resolutions. Our method
performs a partial static escape analysis of each class at compile-time and then annotates
the intermediate representation of that class with information which the just-in-time (JIT)
compiler can use for object resolution. We apply this technique to the safeTSA intermediate
representation, producing a simple extension to safeTSA’s type system that guarantees a
safe and verifiable transmission of the annotated program.
1 Introduction
Garbage collection is an important aide to programmer productivity, but it requires
extra runtime overhead to manage memory allocations and deallocations. In a naive
Java implementation, all objects will be created in a garbage collected heap, while
local variables, containing booleans, characters, numeric types and references to
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objects, are stored on the more efficient runtime stack. Allocating objects on the
heap is less efficient, because of the extra overhead of finding free space during
allocation and finding unreachable objects when the garbage collector runs.
In general, reducing the number of objects managed by a garbage collector will
improve its performance. Object resolution 3 is an optimization technique that aims
to decrease the garbage collector’s workload by allocating as much data as possi-
ble on the stack instead of the heap. Investigations have shown that a significant
number of objects behave like traditional automatic variables and can be allocated
on the runtime stack. McDowell reports in [14] that in the programs in that study,
between 0% and 56% of the objects could be stack allocated, but typically 5–15%
of the objects could be allocated on the stack. These results demonstrate object
resolution’s potential as a productive optimization technique for object oriented
programs.
Object resolution can be performed only for objects whose lifetime can never
exceed the scope of the method in which the object is created. The objects for
which this is true can be determined through an escape analysis such as that in [5].
If the escape analysis determines that the object is restricted to the method’s static
scope, the object’s fields can be allocated on the stack[4].
Unfortunately in the presence of dynamic loading, the static object resolution of
even simple applications is often infeasible. Indeed, in most cases the information
necessary for object resolution is only available at execution time when the contents
of external methods are available. Running a simple escape analysis algorithm for
the Java Grande Benchmark programs, it turned out that most of the candidates
found for object resolution cannot be optimized at compile time due f.e. unknown
constructors of created objects from different classes or the access to fields of arrays
where the index is not known. Deferring the analysis until runtime, however, means
that the CPU cycles spent performing the escape analysis are CPU cycles that are
not spent executing the program. For this reason, it is beneficial to minimize the
runtime cost of the escape analysis; this can be done by performing a partial escape
analysis at compile-time and attaching the results as annotations to the individual
program modules.
In the paper we introduce a safe and efficient annotation technique for the trans-
portation of escape information. Our method statically derives each class’s escape
information during its compilation to an intermediate representation and then an-
notates that representation with information that can be used by the JIT compiler in
order to quickly identify and transformation non-escaping objects into their scalar
counterparts. This technique is realized as an extension to the safeTSA intermedi-
ate representation[1].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we discuss in more
detail why a static, offline object resolution is insufficient for modern programs.
Section 3 gives a brief introduction into the safeTSA intermediate representation,
and section 4 describes the extensions of safeTSA’s machine model required for the
3 also called stack allocation[4]
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safe transmission of escape annotations. In section 5, we discuss related work, and
section 6 concludes discussing the prospects for further development.
2 Escape Analysis and Object Resolution
In a typical implementation of an object-oriented language, each object is repre-
sented in memory as a tag indicating its type, some instance fields and some fields
that holds information about methods that can be invoked on that object. If an
object’s lifetime can be determined to end at or before the allocating method termi-
nates (for example, if only its fields are accessed but the reference to the object is
otherwise unused), field accesses to this object can be transformed into local vari-
able accesses of the allocating method. We call this process, of transforming an
object’s allocation into a collection of local variable declarations and the object’s
fields’ accesses into variable accesses, object resolution.
Escape analysis accuracy limits the effectiveness of finding opportunities for
object resolution. Most escape analysis research has concentrated on the develop-
ment of static whole-program escape analysis techniques. But in environments that
provide pervasive separate compilation and dynamic linking (for example, the Java
Virtual Machine’s dynamic class loading mechanism), a compile-time static escape
analysis will often be unable to identify many of the object resolution opportunities.
In the presence of such dynamic class loading mechanisms, the contents of external
methods cannot be determined at compile-time, so any static compile-time analysis
must make worse case assumptions (that is, it must assume that each object passed
to an external method will escape) 4 , resulting in an imprecise derivation of escape
information and a low rate of object resolution. Despite these restrictions , most
escape analyses that have been developed for Java are static compile-time analyses
(for example, [7]). As a result most Java escape analyses, require that the potential
user, forgot Java’s dynamic class loading and separate compilation facilities.
Although, in general, object resolution of Java programs must be deferred until
runtime, there a few situations in which static compile-time object resolution will
be successful. In fact, there are only two such cases:
• Object resolution always can be performed statically for an array a that is defined
in a method f of class c, if and only if, the number of elements of a are known
at compilation time and the reference of a is never used, directly or indirectly,
except by being passed as a parameter to and among other statically determined
methods of c.
• Object resolution for objects o other than arrays that have been defined in a
method f of class c can be performed at compilation time, if and only if, the
reference to o will only be used, directly or indirectly, to access fields or by be-
ing passed as a parameter to and among other statically determined methods of
c.
4 due the Java language specification allows only one class for each classfile
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private class Complex{
Complex addRandom2Complex(Complex z){
RandomComplex r = new RandomComplex();
z.real += r.real;
z.imag +=r.imag;
return z;
}
}
(a)
class FrameCheck{
boolean checkIntersect(FRect upper){
FRect lower = new FRect(10,15,30,30);
return upper.intersects(lower);
}
}
(b)
Fig. 1. Programs that disallow static object resolution.
In all other cases a conducted object resolution can lead to situations in which the
runtime behavior of a program could be changed and therefore object resolution
should not be performed at compilation time. Figure 1 shows two example pro-
grams written in Java for which a static object resolution cannot be performed.
The method addRandom2Complex() in Figure 1 (a), first generates a random
complex number. It, then, adds this number to the complex number received as
its parameter. Finally, it returns the result of the addition to the callers side. At
first glance it appears that the object r can be transformed into two stack allocated
variables real and imag. A closer view of the program, however, exposes that the
condition for static object resolution of general objects which we stated above is
not fulfilled. This is because a constructor call in Java can be seen as a method
call which takes an implicit reference to the allocated object as an argument, but
the constructor of class RandomComplex is not a member of class Complex.
If one were to attempt to stack allocate r but then when RandomComplex class
was loaded, its default constructor were to, for example, append a reference to
the object to a static linked list, then the reference could remain alive after the
addRandom2Complex() method were to exit, and the reference would now point
to a location which may be reused for another purpose, violating language type
safety. 5 Figure 1 (b) shows another example which is not optimizable at compile
time. The class FrameCheck offers a method checkIntersects() to determine if
a newly placed upper frame intersects an already existing lower frame. The lower
frame is passed to a method called intersects() that checks a possibly intersection
to a given frame. As in the first example, the methods called (in this case, both the
constructor FRect() and the method intersects()) are not defined inside the class
5 indeed static compile-time object resolution would be successful for a similar method
addComplex2Complex, as the constructor of the analyzed class is accessible
4
Hartmann et al.
(a) Program in SSA (b) Type-Safe Program in safeTSA
Fig. 2. Sample program
and therefore may change at runtime.
3 SafeTSA
SafeTSA[1] is a type safe intermediate representation designed as a machine in-
dependent intermediate representation which is both trivial to verify and easy to
translate into optimized machine code. The safeTSA representation is a static sin-
gle assignmentvariant in that it differentiates not between variables of the original
program, but only between unique definitions of these variables.
Unlike straightforward SSA representations, safeTSA provides intrinsic and
tamper-proof referential integrity as a well-formedness property of the encoding
itself. Another key idea of safeTSA is type separation: values of different types are
kept separate in such a manner that even a hand-crafted malicious program cannot
undermine type safety and concomitant memory integrity. Details can be found
in [1]. The following, is a short introduction to safeTSA’s type separation, which
will be used in the next section to safely encode the results of partial static escape
analysis.
Figure 2 (a) shows on the left side a source program fragment and on the right
side a sketch of how this might look translated into SSA form. Each line in the
SSA representation corresponds to an instruction that defines a new SSA variable.
These variables are named by labeling the instructions with consecutive integer
numbers; in this illustration, an arrow to the left of each instruction points to a label
that designates the specific target variable implicitly specified by each instruction.
References to previously computed values in other instructions are denoted by en-
closing the label of the previous value in parentheses - in our depiction, we have
used (i) and (j) as placeholders for the instructions that compute the initial values
of i and j.
One problem with SSA representation lies in the type safety of a program, i.e.
be assure that all operand uses are type conform. A malicious code supplier might
want to provide us with an illegal program in which instructions will use operands
that are non type conforming, e.g. in Figure 2 (a) the integer addition in (10) would
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Fig. 3. Implied Machine Model of safeTSA
be applied to an boolean operand. Type safety is guaranteed in our intermediate
representation by the concept of type separation.
While the “implied machine model” of ordinary SSA is one with an unlimited
number of registers (=SSA variables), safeTSA uses a model in which there is a
separate register plane for every type. The register planes are created implicitly,
taking into account the predefined types, imported types, and local types occurring
in the mobile program (Figure 3). In safeTSA the selection of the appropriate regis-
ter plane is implicitly given by an operation, that is, every instruction automatically
selects the appropriate plane for the source and destination registers. The operands
of the instruction merely specify the particular register numbers on the thereby
selected planes. Moreover, the destination register on the appropriate destination
register plane is also chosen implicitly—on each plane, registers are simply filled
in ascending order.
In this example, the operation integer-addition takes two register numbers as
its parameters, src1 and src2. It will implicitly fetch its two source operands from
register integer-src1, integer-src2, and deposit its result in the next available integer
register. There is no way a malicious adversary can change integer addition to
operate on operands other than integers, or generate a result other than an integer.
The result of applying type separation to the program of Figure 2 (a) are shown in
Figure 2 (b).
Construction of Memory Safety
For the construction of memory safety our machine model provides for every refer-
ence type ref a matching type safe-ref that denotes that the variable has been null-
checked. Similarly, for every array arr we provide a matching type safe-index-arr
whose instances may assume only values that are index values within legal range.
Null-checking then becomes an operation that takes an explicit ref source type
and an explicit register number on the corresponding register plane. If the check
succeeds, the ref value is copied to an implicitly given register (the next available)
on the plane of the corresponding safe-ref type, otherwise an exception will be
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generated. Similarly, the index-check operation will take an array and the number
of an integer register, check that the integer value is within bounds, and if the check
succeeds, copy the integer value to the appropriate safe-index register plane.
Null-checking and index-checking can be generalized to include all type-cast
operations: an xupcast operation involves a dynamic check and will cause an ex-
ception if it fails. In the case of success, it will copy the value being cast to the
next available free register on the plane of the target type (only the dynamic check
will result in actual code at the target machine, but not the copy operation). The
downcast operation never fails and will never result in any actual target code.
All memory operations in safeTSA require that the storage designator is already
in the safe state; i.e., these operations will take operands only from the register
plane of a safe-ref or safe-index type, but not from the corresponding unsafe types.
There are four different primitives for memory access:
getfield ref-type object field
setfield ref-type object field value
getelt array-type object index
setelt array-type object index value
where ref-type denotes a reference type in the type table, object designates a
register number on the plane of the corresponding safe-ref type, field is a symbolic
reference to a data member of ref-type, and value designates a register number on
the plane corresponding to the type of field. Similarly, for array references, object
designates a register on the plane of the array type that contains the array’s base
address and index designates a register on the array’s safe-index plane that contains
the index.
Pimitive Operations and Method Calls
Primitive operations in safeTSA are subordinate to types and there are only two
generic instructions:
primitive base-type operation operand1 operand2. . .
xprimitive base-type operation operand1 operand2. . .
where base-type is a symbolic reference into the type table, operation is a sym-
bolic reference to an operation defined on this type, and operand1. . . operandN
designate register numbers on the respective planes corresponding to the parameter
types of the operation. In each case, the result is deposited into the next available
register on the plane corresponding to the result type of the operation.
Three primitives provide method invocation with and without dynamic dis-
patch:
xcall base-typer method operand1 operand2. . .
xcall-instance base-type receiver method operand1 operand2. . .
xdispatch base-type receiver method operand1 operand2. . .
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where base-type identifies the static type of the receiver object, receiver desig-
nates the register number of the actual receiver object on the corresponding plane,
method is a symbolic reference to the method being invoked, and operand1 . . . operandN
designate register numbers on the respective planes corresponding to the parameter
types of the method. The result will be deposited into the next available register on
the plane corresponding to the result type of the method.
4 Code Annotation in SafeTSA
Code annotation for supporting efficient runtime object resolution can be added to
safeTSA by extending its type system. A static compile-time partial escape analysis
is performed individually on each program unit and the resulting escape informa-
tion is added to the unit as annotation. These annotations can be safely transported
by adding an additional dimension of register planes in safeTSA’s machine model
and storing the escape annotations as type specializations within the safeTSA rep-
resentation.
At runtime, we need to know, for each location where objects are created,
whether they can outlive the method in which its memory is allocated (that is,
whether the objects’ definition can escape the scope of the surrounding method); if
it is known that they cannot escape, then they can be allocated on the stack as part
of the method’s call frame. But at the time individual program units are compiled
only a partial answer can be provided to the this question. Each definition of a
reference to an object 6 is categorized as normal (that is, no guarantees are made
about whether it will escape), as strongly-bounded (that is, it is only used for field
accesses within the surrounding method or passed as a strongly bounded parameter
to other methods in the same program unit, and thus does not escape the surround-
ing method’s scope) or as maybe-bounded (that is, the reference is not returned by
the method or copied directly to the heap, but it may be passed as a parameter to
other methods from which it may escape).
Thus, the safeTSA machine model will be extended with the three escape classi-
fications, so that for each Java class, there are six reference types (original safeTSA
has two). In one dimension, each reference type is classified as either non-null
(”safe”) or possibly-null; in the other dimension (shown in Fig. 4, each reference
is classified normal, maybe-bounded, or strongly-bounded.
In this extended model, SSA variables that stand for object references of a class
A can be assigned a type mbnd − A if the reference definition is maybe-bounded,
but SSA variables which refer to references that may escape without restriction will
be assigned the normal reference type A. In addition, parameter definition of type
A can be annotated as type mbnd − A or sbnd− A 7 .
6 The definitions of particular interest are the initial memory allocations, the method parameters,
andφ-functions. References created by array accesses and returned from methods are conservatively
treated as having escaped.
7 Note, in order to preserve dynamically linking across implementation changes that effect escape
properties, the caller is not required to match the callee’s parameters’ escape annotations exactly.
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Fig. 4. Extended machine model.
The above type extensions can be used at runtime to identify the objects which
can be created on the stack rather than on the heap by checking some simple con-
straints. Strongly-bound reference creations can always be stack allocated. (The
linker must verify that strongly-bounded SSA variables are only passed to callees
which annotate the corresponding parameter as strongly-bounded 8 .) A maybe-
bounded reference variables m can be changed into a strongly-bounded (and stack
allocated), if its users are either φ-functions which are of or can be changed into
having the appropriate strongly-bounded type and/or method calls where the cor-
responding formal parameter is or can be changed into the appropriate strongly-
bounded type 9 .
These conditions are implemented by the following procedure:
. Mark all object reference creations a that are of type mbnd.
. Trace the flow of a through φ-functions and identify all indirect users.
. Determine for each marked definition a the methods f that are passed a (directly
or through φ-functions) as an argument 10 .
. Check for each method f the type of the corresponding formal parameter p.
- If for all p, the type of p is sbnd, the object creation may be optimized.
- If for any p, the type of p is normal (that is not mbnd or sbnd), the object
creation may not be optimized.
- Otherwise, every p is sbnd or mbnd and some p is mbnd. For every p which
is mbnd, check recursively if p is bounded. If all checks succeed the object
creation may be optimized, otherwise it must be left unoptimized.
Results may be cached by changing mbnd parameters/variables into sbnd and nor-
mal parameters/variables as appropriate.
Modification of the Instruction Set
The extension of safeTSA’s machine model, requires certain changes in the safeTSA
instruction set. These changes, described below, are constructed in such a manner
to guarantee the safe transmission of the escape information, so that the received
These callee’s annotations are promises about what the callee will do with the method.
8 If Java binary compatibility rules are to be observed, these will initially only be calls to final or
static methods within the same compilation unit as the caller.
9 translated, we allow maybe-bounded definitions to be used in strongly-bounded uses, not reverse.
10 Note, due polymorphism, one call site may have multiple callees, all of which must be considered
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partial escape analysis results are guarantied to be correct with respect to the re-
ceived program.
The definition of a bounded object reference excludes it to be used as a return
value. Therefore, the return instruction will automatically only select object refer-
ence variables from the normal register planes, which guarantees that no operand
of type sbnd or mbnd will ever be returned from this kind of instruction.
An instruction in safeTSA implicitly takes its operand from the SSA variables
in the corresponding register plane and stores its result value automatically in the
next free variable in the register plane of its result type. This continues to hold for
the extended machine model, but some instructions operate equally on references
types of different ”boundedness”, these instructions require an addition modifier
n, s, or m to specify on whether instructions should operate on the normal, sbnd,
or mbnd register planes, respectively. Because there is not a 1:1 correspondence
of boundedness between the caller’s and the callee’s formal method parameters,
operand-list always denotes a list of pairs (arg,mod), where arg stands for the ar-
gument operand and mod specifies which of the reference-type register planes the
argument operand is to be chosen from. In the following table we describe the most
important instructions that will affected by the insertion of an additional modifier.
• new: The new operator stands in safeTSA for the allocation of objects. An
application of the new instruction delivers an object that is from a safe reference
type, that is implicitly given by this instruction itself. The instruction will be
extended by a modifier that specifies in which kind of register plane the result
should be stored 11
new class constructor operand-list -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
• xupcast, downcast: Instructions xupcast and downcast copy values from one
register set to an another register set. We provide only a single mod annotation,
and require that both types be of the correct boundedness. This is sufficient to
ensure that, for example, an sbnd variable cannot be cast to a normal variable
and then allowed to escape.
xupcast ref-type ref-type object -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
downcast ref-type ref-type object -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
• getfield, setfield, getelem, setelem, xdispatch, xcall-instance:
Instructions that can be used for memory accesses and method calls have to be
extended with a modifier that specifies from which register plane the object that
will accessed by the instruction, has to be taken.
getfield ref-type object field -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
setfield ref-type object field value -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
getelem array-type object index -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
setelem array-type object index value -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
xdispatch base-type receiver method operand-list -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
xcall-instance base-type method operand-list -mod, where mod ∈ {n,m, s}
11 The s modifier can be used (and maintain Java binary compatibility) for calls to constructors
within the same compilation unit as the caller.
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final class FRect{
int x, y, width, height;
public FRect(int x, int y, int width, int height){
this.x = x; this.y = y;
this.width = width;
this.height = height;
}
boolean intersects(FRect r){
FrameBorder.incDefBorder(r);
return!((r.x + r.width <= x)||
(r.y + r.height >= y)||
(r.x >= x + width)||
(r.y >= y + height));
}
}
final class FrameBorder{
static void incDefBorder(FRect r){
r.x -= 2; r.y -= 2;
r.width += 2;
r.height += 2;
}
}
Fig. 5. Classes FRect (a) and FrameBorder (b)
Example of A Code Annotation
We refer back to the sample program of Figure 1 (b), as an example of how our
annotation technique in action. Note that this program is not amenable to static,
compile-time object resolution because either of the classes FRect or FrameBorder
could be change independently after the compilation process (invalidating any static
compile-time object resolution). Figure 5 shows the class definition of FRect and
FrameBorder as they are loaded by the classloader of our JIT-Compiler.
During the compilation of the classes FRect, FrameBorder and FrameCheck,
an extended safeTSA file will be generated for each class. Figure 6 depicts the
methods checkIntersect, intersects and incDefBorder after compilation.
In checkIntersect parameter p1 is assigned the type sbnd as the compile stat-
ically can verify that that reference is safely bounded. In contrast, the reference
to object produced by the new operator will be assigned type mbnd as it will be
passed as an argument to the method intersects. In method intersects the parameter
is assigned type mbnd as it will be given as an argument to method incDefBorder,
but the parameter definition in method incDefBorder is assigned a sbnd type since
the reference variable created from p1 is safely bounded to the method.
Because the method checkIntersect will be called during program execution and
the JIT-Compiler has not already compiled this method, the classloader first will
load class FrameCheck. Preliminary analysis of method checkIntersect reveals that
the object referenced by variable lower could be a candidate for an object resolution
since lower is of type mbnd. Checking if an object resolution on this object can
be performed, the classloader will first load class FRect and verifies whether the
parameter of intersects escapes the method. Since the parameter of intersects is not
11
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enter method boolean checkIntersect(sbnd-FRect p1)
mbnd-FRect-0: new FRect -m
void: xcall <init> FRect (0) \$(10,n),(15,n),(30,n),(30,n) -m
sbnd-#FRect-0: xupcast FRect #FRect (p1) -s
boolean-0: xdispatch #FRect (0) intersects \$(0,m) -s
boolean-1: return boolean 0
enter method boolean intersects(mbnd-FRect p1)
void: xcall FrameBorders #class includeSmallBorders \$(p1,m)
mbnd-#FRect-0: xupcast FRect #FRect p1 -m
int-0: getfield #FRect (0) x -m
int-1: getfield #FRect (0) width -m
int-2: iadd (0) (1)
int-3: getfield #FRect #this x -s
boolean-0: ilte (2),(3)
int-4: getfield #FRect (0) y -m
int-5: getfield #FRect (0) height -m
int-6: iadd (4),(5)
int-7: getfield #FRect #this y -s
boolean-1: ilte (6),(7)
boolean-2: bbor (0) (1)
int-7: getfield #FRect #this width -s
int-8: iadd (3),(7)
boolean-3: igte (0),(8)
boolean-4: bbor (2),(3)
int-9: getfield #FRect #this height -s
int-10: iadd (7),(9)
boolean-5: igte (4),(10)
boolean-6: bbor (4) (5)
boolean-7: bbnot (6)
boolean-8: bbreturn (7)
enter method void incDefBorder(sbnd-FRect p1)
sbnd-#FRect-0: xupcast FRect #FRect p1 -s
int-0: getfield #FRect (0) x -s
int-1: isub (0),const-2
void: setfield #FRect (0) x (1) -s
int-2: getfield #FRect (0) y -s
int-3: isub (2),const-2
void: setfield #FRect (0) y (3) -s
int-4: getfield #FRect (0) width -s
int-5: iadd (4),const-2
void: setfield #FRect (0) width (5) -s
int-6: getfield #FRect (0) height -s
int-7: iadd (6),const-2
void: setfield #FRect (0) height (7) -s
Fig. 6. Sample methods after type extension.
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defined as a sbnd type, class FrameBorders has to be loaded and the analysis will
proceed with the method incDefBorder. The sbnd parameter declaration of method
incDefBorder indicates that the parameter does not escape its method. As a result
the analyzer concludes that the parameter definition of method intersects also is
safely bound and therefore can be transformed into a sbnd type. This means that
an object reference that is passed to intersects cannot escape the method and hence
an object resolution on the object accessible via variable lower can be performed.
5 Related Work
Earliest investigations in escape analysis were done by Park and Goldberg[15],
which developed an escape analysis for functional languages, which is based on
reference lifetime, and operating on lists. In [18] Steensgaard has develops an in-
terprocedural flow-insensitive points-to analysis with near-linear time-complexity.
Whaley combines points-to and escape analysis into a points-to-escape graph, and
uses this data structure in order to eliminate superfluous synchronization of thread-
bound objects and to stack-allocate strongly-bounded objects [20]. Threads are
also handled in [16], where Salcianu describes a technique for obtaining precise
points-to and escape information for objects accessed by multiple threads. Vivien
et al.[19] provide an algorithm for incremental pointer and alias analysis.
Choi et al.[5] applied escape analysis to perform stack allocation and reduce
inter-thread synchronization utilizing connection graphs. Their method is similar
to works done in the area of alias and points-to graphs, but their graphs can be more
easily summarized to avoid the effort of recomputing escape information when
a method is called in different scopes. Another application is given in [9]; Gay
and Steensgaard describe an approach which analysis results will be used for the
allocation of objects on the runtime stack. Their technique will typically detect
only a subset of objects that can be stack allocated and, in addition, makes the
conservative assumption that objects escape when they are stored in other objects.
Blanchet applies the results of his escape analysis to the stack allocation of ob-
jects in Java[4]. His technique can determine escape information for assignments
precisely. Compared to Blanchets work, our technique benefits from a precomputed
SSA form and handles dynamically loaded classes at runtime without requiring a
full dynamic escape analysis. Besides escape analyses, there are other analyses
that can be used to guide stack allocation or object resolution. Alias analysis[6],
reference counting[11,12] and storage use analysis[17] can also be utilized in sup-
port object resolution. In general, using these analyses for object resolution will be
much more expensive than using a standard escape analysis technique[4].
Code annotation for program representations have not been as thoroughly re-
searched as escape analysis, but recently, various annotations have been proposed
for enhancing the performance of JIT compilers using Java bytecode and other in-
termediate representations[3]. Krintz et al.[13] annotates bytecode for increasing
the performance of programs executed by JVMs. Franz et al.[8] annotate programs
syntax trees with escape information and encode them for safe transportation. Both
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[13] and [8] guarantee the safety of their annotations. Hannan uses a functional
approach for the annotation of escape information types in [10]. In contrast to our
work, he excludes dynamic class loading and gives no algorithm for the computa-
tion of types.
6 Conclusion
Static object resolution is often not feasible even in very simple programs. This is
because the information necessary for object resolution is often only available at
execution time when the whole program is loaded. But dynamic object resolution
requires that the time spent determining escape information is taken away from
program execution. The runtime cost of a dynamic escape analysis can be reduced
by performing a partial escape analysis at compile-time and attaching the results as
annotations to the individual program units.
In this paper we have presented a safe and efficient annotation technique that
reduces the runtime overhead, which is needed for performing object resolution.
Our method performs a partial static escape analysis of each class at compile-time
and then annotates the intermediate representation of that class with this informa-
tion, which the JIT-compiler can use for object resolution. We apply this tech-
nique to the safeTSA intermediate representation, producing a simple extension
to safeTSA’s type system that guarantees a safe and verifiable transmission of the
annotated program.
As part of a larger project, we have developed a system consisting of a Java to
safeTSA compiler and a JVM extended to support just-in-time compilation from
safeTSA to native PowerPC code[2]. Currently we are in the process of adding
support for our our code annotation technique into the safeTSA system.
References
[1] W. Amme, N. Dalton, J. von Ronne, and M. Franz. SafeTSA: A type safe and
referentially secure mobile-code representation based on static single assignment
form. In SIGPLAN ’01 Conference on Programming Language Design and
Implementation, pages 137–147, 2001.
[2] W. Amme, J. von Ronne, and M. Franz. Using the safetsa representation to boost the
performance of an existing java virtual machine. In 10th International Workshop on
Compilers for Parallel Computers (CPC), 2003.
[3] A. Azevedo, A. Nicolau, and J. Hummel. An annotation-aware java virtual machine
implementation. Concurrency - Practice and Experience, 12(6):423–444, 2000.
[4] B. Blanchet. Escape analysis for object-oriented languages: application to Java. ACM
SIGPLAN Notices, 34(10):20–34, 1999.
[5] J.-D. Choi, M. Gupta, M. J. Serrano, V. C. Sreedhar, and S. P. Midkiff. Escape analysis
for java. In Conference on Object-Oriented, pages 1–19, 1999.
14
Hartmann et al.
[6] A. Deutsch. Interprocedural may-alias analysis for pointers: beyond k-limiting. ACM
SIGPLAN Notices, 29(6):230–241, 1994.
[7] R. Fitzgerald, T. B. Knoblock, et al. Marmot: An optimizing compiler for Java.
Microsoft Technical Report 3, Microsoft, March 2000.
[8] M. Franz, C. Krintz, V. Haldar, and C. H. Stork. Tamper proof annotations. Technical
Report 02-10, Department of Information and Computer Science, University of
California, Irvine, Mar. 2002.
[9] D. Gay and B. Steensgaard. Fast escape analysis and stack allocation for object-based
programs. In th International Conference on Compiler Construction (CC’2000),
volume 1781. Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[10] J. Hannan. A type-based escape analysis for functional languages. Journal of
Functional Programming, 8(3):239–273, May 1998.
[11] L. Hederman. Compile-time Garbage Collection Using Reference Count Analysis.
PhD thesis, Rice University, Aug. 1988. Also Rice University Technical Report
TR88–75 but, according to Rice University’s technical report list, this report is no
longer available for distribution.
[12] P. Hudak. A semantic model of reference counting and its abstraction. In Proceedings
of the 1986 ACM Conference on Lisp and Functional Programming, pages 351–363.
ACM, ACM, Aug. 1986.
[13] C. Krintz and B. Calder. Using annotation to reduce dynamic optimization time. In
SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, pages
156–167, 2001.
[14] C. McDowell. Garbage reduction in java. In Internet Publication
http://www.cse.ucsc.edu/research/embedded/pubs/gc, 1982.
[15] Y. G. Park and B. Goldberg. Reference escape analysis: Optimizing reference
counting based on the lifetime of references. In Partial Evaluation and Semantic-
Based Program Manipulation, pages 178–189, 1991.
[16] A. Salcianu and M. C. Rinard. Pointer and escape analysis for multithreaded
programs. In Principles Practice of Parallel Programming, pages 12–23, 2001.
[17] M. Serrano and M. Feeley. Storage use analysis and its applications. In Proceedings of
the 1fst International Conference on Functional Programming, page 12, Philadelphie,
June 1996.
[18] B. Steensgaard. Points-to analysis in almost linear time. In Symposium on Principles
of Programming Languages, pages 32–41, 1996.
[19] F. Vivien and M. C. Rinard. Incrementalized pointer and escape analysis. In SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, pages 35–46,
2001.
[20] J. Whaley and M. Rinard. Compositional pointer and escape analysis for Java
programs. ACM SIGPLAN Notices, 34(10):187–206, 1999.
15
